The long-standing security partnership in the Lake Chad Basin is under significant strain as Niger suspends its role in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), while Chad considers withdrawing altogether.
Established in 1994 by the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), the MNJTF initially brought together Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, later joined by Benin, to counter persistent insecurity in the region. This force has been a symbol of unity among LCBC member states, overcoming historic border disputes and diplomatic tensions.
After a slow start, the MNJTF was revitalized in 2014 in response to escalating Boko Haram violence. With support from the African Union (AU), the task force has since played a critical role in counterterrorism efforts, enabling stabilization and humanitarian initiatives. Its operations have helped curb Boko Haram’s territorial expansion, once threatening major cities such as N’Djamena (Chad), Maroua (Cameroon), and Diffa (Niger).
Despite significant gains, Boko Haram remains entrenched in key areas, including the islands of Lake Chad, Cameroon’s Mandara Mountains, and Nigeria’s Sambisa Forest. The MNJTF has conducted numerous operations to dismantle militant strongholds, neutralizing fighters and recovering weapons. This has led to the gradual revival of cross-border trade and the resettlement of displaced populations in towns like Bagakawa, Monguno, Mallam Fatori, and Banki in Nigeria.
However, insurgent groups have demonstrated resilience, adapting to military strategies. Leadership losses, including the deaths of key figures like Abubakar Shekau, have weakened Boko Haram but have not eliminated its operational capacity. Data from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) indicate continued deadly attacks in 2024 across Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, including the killing of over 40 Chadian soldiers in an October assault on Barkaram.
Niger’s 2023 political upheaval has led to its disengagement from the MNJTF, creating a security vacuum in the Baroua region, where Bakura Doro, a prominent Boko Haram leader, is based. Chad has also expressed frustration with the MNJTF’s coordination, launching its own operation against insurgents after the Barkaram attack, citing inadequate support from partner states.
Beyond political rifts, the MNJTF faces logistical and operational constraints. Challenges include insufficient troops and equipment for deployment in difficult terrains, the persistent use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by militants, and inadequate financial resources.
The transnational nature of the Lake Chad Basin’s security crisis necessitates a collective response. Without a strong regional coalition, individual national efforts may prove ineffective. To prevent a collapse similar to the G5 Sahel force—which disbanded due to failed military cooperation—LCBC states must urgently address internal disputes and operational inefficiencies.
Recent diplomatic overtures by Nigeria towards Niger and Chad should be expanded to maintain the integrity of the MNJTF. The upcoming Fourth Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum in Maiduguri presents an opportunity for high-level discussions to assess the force’s performance and address grievances. Additionally, LCBC defense ministers must convene to reinforce commitments and ensure continued collaboration.
Beyond military intervention, member states must also invest in the LCBC’s broader mission, which includes sustainable water management, ecosystem conservation, and regional integration. Strengthening these areas can contribute to long-term stability and peace.
Finally, greater technical and financial support from the international community is essential to bolster the MNJTF’s strategic capabilities. A weakened force could allow violent extremism to resurge, threatening not only the Lake Chad region but also broader West and Central Africa.
The decisions made in the coming months will be critical in determining the future of regional security and cooperation in the Lake Chad Basin.
